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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE QF THE CASE 
This case deals with the jurisdiction of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court for San Juan County over the defendant, a 
member of the Navajo Indian Tribe residing on the Navajo 
Reservation, in an action to recover child support monies 
expended by the State of Utah for the benefit of the defendant's 
children who do not reside on the reservation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan 
County, State of Utah denied a Motion to Vacate a Judgment which 
had previously been entered against the defendant on the ground 
that membership in the tribe and residing on the reservation did 
not, as a matter of law, deprive the court of jurisdiction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent/ State of Utah, respectfully asks that the 
ruling of the Seventh District Court for San Juan County be 
affirmed and that the previously entered judgment against the 
appellant be found valid and enforceable. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent respectfully submits the following Statement 
of the Facts inasmuch as the Statement of the Facts in 
Appellant's brief did not contain page references to the record 
and also contained facts which are not supported by the record 
and which possibly were not presented to the lower court. 
Appellant, Daniel Vijil (hereinafter "Mr. Vijil"), is 
an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe (R. 12). He is a resident 
of Aneth, Utah within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo 
Reservation (R. 14). Mr. Vijil is the father of Frederick, 
Orlando, and Azalea Vijil (hereinafter "the dependent children"), 
all of whom are enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe (R. 12). 
From the period of time from November 1, 1983 to December 31, 
1983, the State of Utah expended $820.00 for the benefit of the 
dependent children. 
On or about December 13, 1983, a Notice of Support Debt 
was sent to Mr. Vijil from the Utah Department of Social Services 
pursuant to the Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45b-5 (1977) (R. 1). Mr. Vijil failed to attend an informal 
conference or request a formal hearing as required by the Notice 
(R. 14). On March 6, 1984, an award for $724.00 was entered 
against Mr. Vijil representing his child support obligation (R. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAVAJO TRIBE DID NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY DEPRIVE THE STATE DISTRICT COURT OF 
JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION TO RECOVER CHILD 
SUPPORT SINCE TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP IS MERELY ONE 
FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER 
STATE ACTION WOULD INFRINGE ON THE RIGHT OF 
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the lower court as reflected in the record, the court could not 
rule that these two factors alone would prevent state court 
jurisdiction. 
As pointed out in the Appellantfs brief. Congress has 
established guidelines for the assumption of civil jurisdiction 
by states. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (a) provides in part: 
The consent of the United States is 
hereby given to any State not having 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action 
between Indians or to which Indians are 
parties which arise in the areas of Indian 
country situated within such State to assume, 
with the consent of the tribe occupying the 
particular Indian country or part thereof 
which would be affected by such assumption, 
such measure of jurisdiction over any or all 
such civil causes of action arising within 
£.uch Indian country or any part thereof as 
may be determined by such State to the same 
extent that such State has jurisdiction over 
other civil causes of action... 
(Emphasis added.) Consent under this statute could confer upon a 
state the sole jurisdiction over civil causes of action within 
the state as if the reservation did not exist. While the Navajo 
tribe has not consented to the assumption of such civil 
jurisdiction, it is important to note that Congress was not 
attempting to deny states the right to jurisdiction for wrongs 
occurring off the reservation and within the state. Thus there 
are some situations in which state courts exercise jurisdiction 
over members of an Indian tribe. 
The matter before this court involves an Indian's 
obligation to support his dependent children. While the record 
is silent on the point, Appellant's brief notes that Mr. Vijil's 
children were residing off the reservation in the state of Utah 
-4-
til t l ie Lime they r e c e i v e d p u b l i c i s s i s t a n c r ' A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f „t 
4 ) . in l i c jn t oi " -. f a c t , • , c-* -:. -^ > * -ot r» *. 
m)i* i : : ! i | ' i « i i"' 
withih itie Stale u. -tvt , the decisit 
court c.n be affirmed win-nit -..-- tn.,, .elusion w u n 
.. - .
 h<a
 court 
Cdnnut" automatical!; : * i ,<eraD- : -: i.jr N G V ^ :I L.-
s u b 3 e c t t: o t •i** i u r 1 -.:*-:•': . 1 
iiH.'itl'i iiuciiu'ii. I n - . . . oe r smt ' * . : - . . . . ,.u r ^ ^ n d ^ x * 
C o u r t s wt* , . a u d i t i o n a i t a c t s b e f o r e t (<-'• - ^ ^ 
which have lien n .ask 
c h i l d s u p p o r t w a t t t . i . - .^Kx i , lie d ^ i u d C i i nney nave : 3 M : ! . . 
Some c o u r t s look Lc i- «.xten: ' - : rij-in1- c o n t a c t s w t - *.ne 
. . . . . . ng 
facto * -iie .".: . v- *. :etner the state. / u: t .ssuja^t.wi ..f 
The case : . .^,. . i^JLeX* Pi^nmond v. Flammonc, 
Mont. 
wire n v m c i *.;: r . .nitiated tm
 Fr ^ ceeainq wni^n 
: . ested the wuiiu' 
.-J nusban^ w.. oxu^u eservation. Tut Kontc\. 
Supreme ^L r* ^ b u ; t *- defendant . ^ ^  rathe*1, • -^ 
anv * - . * 
Montai la. Since the wile was residing in Luino:;(.a -^.n L^. 
initiated the UKESA proceeding from tntit, uiic couii uuieu uiiat 
the acts of nonsupport had not occurred in Montana, but rather in 
California. Had the wife and children resided in Montana, the 
decision may have been different. 
In the present case, there were no representations 
which would warrant a finding that Mr. Vijil did not have 
contacts, even significant or substantial contacts, with the 
State of Utah. Indeed, as the court concluded, the fact that Mr. 
Vijil1s children received public assistance from the State of 
Utah would seem to indicate at least some contact with the State. 
Some courts have taken the approach that was identified 
in the case of Williams v. Leer 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In 
discussing the appropriateness of state action, the Supreme Court 
concluded that "the question has always been whether the state 
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them." Id* at 220. 
The Williams v. Lee approach was applied by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court in the case of Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 
499 P.2d 691 (1972), a case in which the court considered the 
question of whether the state courts had jurisdiction in a URESA 
action initiated by a wife in Wisconsin against her husband, a 
Zuni Indian residing on the Zuni Indian Reservation. In 
upholding the state court's jurisdiction, the court stated: 
It is our view that the application 
of the Act, supra, to this appellant in no way 
interferes with the internal self-government 
of the Zuni Tribe, nor does it contravene any 
express federal grant or reservation.... No 
citation is needed to support the moral and 
social obligation of a parent to support his 
children. 
Xd. at 693. 
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Another New Mexico case, State Securities, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973), discusses the 
Williams v. Lee approach, surveys a number of cases and other 
authorities, and concludes: 
We believe a reasonable summary of 
the preceding law, especially as it applies 
to New Mexico, may be found in Ransom and 
Gilstrap, Indians - Civil Jurisdiction in New 
Mexico - State, Federal and Tribal Courts, 1 
N.M. Law Rev. 196 (1971). In this scholarly 
article the authors conclude: "It may be, 
then, that exclusive Indian jurisdiction 
exists when an action involves a proprietary 
interest in Indian land; or when an Indian 
sues another Indian on a claim for relief 
recognized only by tribal custom or law; or, 
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment argument, 
when an Indian is suing or being sued by 
another Indian or non-Indian over an 
occurrence or transaction arising in Indian 
country about which the Tribe does, or 
foreseeably will, in the exercise of its 
police power, assume sovereign control 
through tribal law, court, or executive 
action.n 
Id. at 789. 
As shown above, there are situations which will warrant 
state court jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes residing 
on the reservation. It is unnecessary to state anything more in 
light of the lower court's ruling. The lower court's ruling must 
be affirmed since the defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment 
failed to state adequate grounds to support the motion. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE COURT 
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AUTOMATICALLY DEPRIVED 
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER AN ENROLLED 
MEMBER OF A TRIBE RESIDING ON A RESERVATION 
SINCE SUFFICIENT OFF-RESERVATION CONTACTS 
WILL SUBJECT A TRIBAL MEMBER TO STATE COURT 
JURISDICTION. 
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Where a state court has properly established subject 
matter jurisdiction over an action involving an Indian residing 
on a reservation on the basis of off-reservation contactsf 
personal jurisdiction follows as a result of the off-reservation 
contacts of the Indian. The same contacts leading to the 
subject-matter jurisdiction are sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction. 
This principle has been recognized in many situations. 
In State Securities, Inc. v. Andersonf supraf where the Indian 
defendant incurred contractual obligations off the reservation 
not only was the court granted personal jurisdiction the court 
also held that state court process could be served on Indians 
while they are within the boundaries of the reservation. 
This concept is emphasized in the case of LeClair v. 
Powers, 632 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1981), a case in which the court, 
after concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a 
divorce proceeding involving an Indian residing on a reservation, 
stated: 
Once the district court has assumed 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and 
process has been properly served, the 
defendant cannot throw up a shield around 
herself by claiming that the state process 
server cannot pierce the exterior boundaries 
of an Indian reservation and serve civil 
process therein. 
632 P.2d at 374 (quoting from the case of Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 
163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 847 
(1974), overruled on another issue 636 P.2d 266 (1981)). 
The determining factor in establishing personal 
jurisdiction over an Indian residing on the reservation is the 
-8-
existence of subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. If 
the subject matter jurisdiction is established/ the personal 
jurisdiction will follow. Although an Indian reservation is in 
many ways considered separate from the state within whose 
boundaries it exists, there is a closer relationship between 
residents of the reservation and the state than exists between 
citizens of two states. Long-arm statutes have not been and 
should not be required in order to reach the reservation's 
inhabitants if subject matter jurisdiction in the state court has 
been established. The above-cited cases confirm the closeness of 
the reservation to the state since state process servers were 
allowed to function within the reservation. 
Once again, the Seventh Judicial District Court 
correctly held that the fact that the defendant was a member of 
the Navajo tribe and resided on the reservation did not preclude 
the state court from having personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a possibility in 
cases involving a member of the Navajo tribe residing on the 
reservation, it must follow that personal jurisdiction is also a 
possibility. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court's ruling which stated that Mr. Vijil's tribal 
membership and reservation residency were not adequate grounds 
for vacating a judgment against Mr. Vijil for child support. The 
facts available to the court, as reflected by the record, were 
limited to the fact that Mr. Vijil was a registered member of the 
Navajo tribe and that he resided on the Navajo reservation. 
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State courts have been found to have subject matter 
jurisdiction over Indians residing on a reservation in matters 
involving significant off-reservation contacts and/or in matters 
where the state action would not interfere with the Indian's 
rights to make their own laws and be governed by them. The lower 
court did not have sufficient information available to make a 
finding that Mr* Vijil did not have off-reservation contacts. 
The fact that his children received public assistance from the 
State of Utah would tend to show that there were such off-
reservation contacts. Some courts have held that child support 
enforcement proceedings do not interfere with an Indian tribe1s 
right to make its own laws and govern its people. 
Personal jurisdiction over Mr. Vijil would exist if the 
lower court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
controversy. The reservation cannot shield an Indian from the 
process of a state court that has subject matter jurisdiction. 
The lower court correctly held that the grounds 
presented by Mr. Vijil in support of his motion to vacate the 
judgment of the state court were insufficient to establish that 
the state court lacked jurisdiction. 
Respondent prays that the ruling of the lower court be 
affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of December, 
1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
MARK E. WAINWRIGHT 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE_OF_UJAH 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL S. VIJIL, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
Abstract No. 255-2 
In this case the defendant has moved the Court 
to Vacate the Judgment heretofore docketed against this 
defendant and does so on the alleged ground that the State 
did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this 
action and, further, that they had no jurisdiction over his 
person. 
The Court has examined the Affidavit submitted, 
with the Motion and finds that no ground is stated upon which 
the Court could grant the Motion. 
The Court cannot automatically rule that no member 
of the Navajo tribe is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts of the State of Utah merely because of membership in 
the tribe and, further, the Court cannot rule as a matter of 
law that the,fact that a defendant who is a member of the 
tribe resides on the reservation deprives the courts of the 
State of Utah of all jurisdiction over his person. 
H> 
Appendix page A-l 
The fact that the State of Utah furnished support 
to the children of the defendant would certainly show that 
the defendant and his family have had contact and dealings with 
the State of Utah which would give the State of Utah jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and the fact that the defendant resides 
on the reservation does not, as a matter of law, deprive it of 
jurisdiction of his person. 
Since these were the only two matters submitted to 
the Court as grounds for the motion, the Court is duty bound 
to deny the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, and does so by 
this document. 
DATED this / 3 day of June, 1984. 
"EOTD" BUNNELL, DISTRICT"'JUDGE 
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